Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322714 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers Series No. 07-02
Verlag: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper uses an equilibrium matching framework to study jointly the optimal private provision of severance pay and the allocational and welfare consequences of government intervention in excess of private arrangements. Firms insure risk-averse workers by means of simple explicit employment contracts. Contracts can be renegotiated ex post by mutual consent. It is shown that the lower bound on the privately optimal severance payment equals the fall in lifetime wealth associated with job loss. Simulations show that, despite contract incompleteness, legislated dismissal costs largely in excess of such private optimum are effectively undone by renegotiation and have only a small allocational effect. Welfare falls. Yet, for deviations from laissez faire in line with those observed for most OECD countries, the welfare loss is small.
Schlagwörter: 
Severance Pay
Contracts
Renegotiation
JEL: 
J23
J64
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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