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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers Series No. 04-16
Verlag: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the effects of legislative bargaining in the EU on public goodsprovision and lobbying. We argue that delegation to a single policy maker at thecentralized level -which we call supranational policy making- increases lobbyingexpenditures. When policy in the center is formulated by a committee consisting ofnational representatives -intergovernmental decision making- centralization causeslobbying expenditures fall, for centralization makes national policy makers moreresponsive to demands from domestic lobbies. In the extensions we consider theeffects of enlargement on lobbying and analyze endogenous lobby formation.
Schlagwörter: 
Centralization
Fiscal Federalism
Legislative Bargaining
Lobbying
the European Union
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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