Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322068 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 3049
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates the impact of reforms altering legal central bank independence (CBI) on monetary policy discipline and credibility, two key mechanisms shaping price stability. Using a sample of 155 countries over more than 50 years (1972-2023), we show that reforms improving CBI strengthen monetary discipline and the credibility of central banks. Larger reforms enhance monetary discipline with a lag, achieving their full effect after ten years. Central bank reforms have a greater impact on monetary discipline in countries that have not reversed earlier reforms. CBI reforms have the strongest impact in democratic countries, countries with flexible exchange rates, and those without a monetary policy strategy. The effects of CBI on monetary discipline and credibility are amplified when public debt-to-GDP ratios are high. These findings underscore the crucial role of CBI as a key factor influencing price stability and highlight the risks associated with weakening institutional autonomy.
Schlagwörter: 
Independence
Money growth
Monetary policy
Institutional reforms
Local projections
JEL: 
C21
C23
E42
E52
E58
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-7235-2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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