Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320708 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Illicit Economies and Development (JIED) [ISSN:] 2516-7227 [Volume:] 5 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 47-57
Publisher: 
LSE Press, London
Abstract: 
How do alternative development programs, designed to diminish the presence of illicit crops, might cause unexpected consequences? This article studies how the announcement about an alternative development program, following the signing of the peace agreement in Colombia, resulted in an increase in coca cultivation. Employing a difference-in-differences methodology, this document evaluates the impact of the National Comprehensive Plan for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS - for its acronyms in Spanish) on the incentives to cultivate coca crops. Our empirical findings show that the announcement of this program led to a substantial average increase of 791 ha of illicit crops per municipality. This increment equates to 40,341 additional hectares, constituting approximately 53% of the overall surge in illicit crop cultivation during the year following the program's announcement. In our exploration of underlying mechanisms, we discuss the interplay of economic incentives for both coca and non-coca cultivators and the electoral motivations of the FARC political party.
Subjects: 
illicit crops
substitution of coca crops
FARC
difference-in-differences
Colombia
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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