Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32012 
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dc.contributor.authorLambsdorff, Johannen
dc.contributor.authorNell, Mathiasen
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-19-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:54:51Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:54:51Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32012-
dc.description.abstractCorrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism: double-dealing, whistle-blowing and extortion are significant uncertainties for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators may use an asymmetric design of (criminal) sanctions and leniency programs to amplify these inherent risks, thereby destabilizing corrupt arrangements. It is also shown that asymmetric penalties and (ex-ante) leniency do not necessarily interfere with the goal of deterrence and may be a useful tool to disband the 'pact of silence' characteristic of corrupt arrangements. In particular, we show that bribe-takers should less be penalized for taking and more for reciprocating a bribe. Likewise, bribe-givers should be punished for giving bribes, but not for accepting the bribetakers' reciprocity.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege) |cGöttingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|acege Discussion Papers |x59en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric penaltiesen
dc.subject.keywordleniencyen
dc.subject.keyword(self-) reportingen
dc.subject.keywordwhistle-blowingen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwKriminalpolitiken
dc.subject.stwKriminalitätsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwOpportunismusen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleFighting corruption with asymmetric penalties and leniency-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn524498032en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cegedp:59en

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