Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319885 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BERG Working Paper Series No. 207
Verlag: 
Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG), Bamberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in prices, and consumption takes place. We illustrate that the award not only incentivizes green investments and may thus reduce environmental externalities. As consumers perceive the product of the awarded firm to be of superior quality, it also gives rise to vertical product differentiation. This induces market power, and thus anti-competitive effects: Rents shift from consumers to producers, and consumer surplus may decrease, particularly if marginal investment costs in green technologies are high compared to the strength of environmental damage.
Schlagwörter: 
Bertrand Competition
Contests
Environmental Award
Green Consumer
Product Differentiation
JEL: 
D43
H23
L13
L51
Q52
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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