Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319640 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik No. 25/3
Publisher: 
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung, Abteilung für Wirtschaftspolitik und Ordnungsökonomik, Freiburg i. Br.
Abstract: 
This paper contrasts two kinds of political economy, represented by welfare economics and social choice theory on the one hand and James M. Buchanan's constitutional political economy on the other hand. It posits that the difference between the two kinds has its roots in the different normative premises on which they are based, premises that I refer to as utility- or preference-individualism and choice-individualism respectively. And I show that, because of their different normative starting points, the two kinds of political economy pursue fundamentally different research agendas.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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