Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316363 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CINCH series No. 2025/02
Publisher: 
University of Duisburg-Essen, CINCH - Health Economics Research Center, Essen
Abstract: 
We study whether the quality of managers can affect public service provision in the context of public health. Using novel data from public hospitals in Chile, we show how the introduction of a competitive recruitment system and better pay for public hospital CEOs reduced hospital mortality by 8%. The effect is not explained by a change in patient composition. We find that the policy changed the pool of CEOs by displacing doctors with no management training in favor of CEOs who had studied management. Productivity improvements were driven by hospitals that recruited higher quality CEOs.
JEL: 
H11
H40
I18
M50
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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