Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316053 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Economics and Political Science (REPS) [ISSN:] 2631-3561 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 56-70
Publisher: 
Emerald, Bingley
Abstract: 
Purpose - This study attempts to figure out the factors that contributed to deposing certain elected presidents before the end of their constitutional terms, alongside tracing the new political context that prevailed in Latin America since 1978 and its impact on direct political participation and military behavior during presidential crises. Design/methodology/approach - The paper uses the comparative method to investigate the causes of presidential instability in three case studies. Findings - The likelihood of presidential instability increases when a president enacts austerity economic policies that marginalize large sectors of the citizenry, becomes implicated in acts of corruption and develops a hostile relationship with members of the ruling coalition. Originality/value - This study integrates the social movement theory with analytical perspectives from parliamentary behavior to explain presidential instability. It attempts to investigate the dynamics of interaction between the acts of furious citizens and disloyal legislators through the in-depth analysis of three case studies.
Subjects: 
Argentina
Brazil
Ecuador
Legislative shield
Neoliberalism
Political scandals
Presidential crisis
Presidential instability
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article

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