Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315208 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 419
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
Digital platforms, now ubiquitous intermediaries in the modern economy, claim to uphold governance rules to ensure a level playing field for their participants. However, there is limited research exploring whether digital platforms fulfill this claim. Furthermore, the antecedents and consequences of any non-compliance remain largely unexamined. This paper addresses this research gap by examining non-compliance in the mobile app market. The empirical study compares the disclosed with the actual behavior concerning device ID transfer for advertising purposes of 852 apps available on Apple and Google platforms across 19 countries. The findings reveal that about 40% of the apps do not comply. Compliance is more prevalent among apps catering to Apple (EU) users than Google (non-European) users. Notably, older apps demonstrate greater compliance. However, popularity and reputation do not explain compliance, while app categories and connections to certain supply-side platforms do. Intriguingly, non-compliant apps earn at least 10% more advertising revenue than they would if being compliant, thus gaining a significant economic edge.
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-418-3
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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