Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314966 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Game Theory [ISSN:] 1432-1270 [Volume:] 53 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer Berlin Heidelberg [Place:] Berlin/Heidelberg [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 989-1004
Publisher: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin/Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Abstract First, we suggest and discuss second-order versions of properties for solutions for TU games used to characterize the Banzhaf value, in particular, of standardness for two-player games, of the dummy player property, and of 2-efficiency. Then, we provide a number of characterizations of the Banzhaf value invoking the following properties: (i) [second-order standardness for two-player games or the second-order dummy player property] and 2-efficiency, (ii) standardness for one-player games, standardness for two-player games, and second-order 2-efficiency, (iii) standardness for one-player games, [second-order standardness for two-player games or the second-order dummy player property], and second-order 2-efficiency. These characterizations also work within the classes of simple games, of superadditive games, and of simple superadditive games.
Subjects: 
TU game
Banzhaf value
Second-order marginal contributions
Second-order payoffs
Amalgamation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Additional Information: 
C71;D60
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
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