Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31441 
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Claremont Colleges Working Papers No. 2002-04
Publisher: 
Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics, Claremont, CA
Abstract: 
Bargaining over two issues as a bundle permits credible cheap talk about their relative importance even when interests are directly opposed on each issue. The resulting communication gains can exceed the gains from bundling previously identified in the monopoly pricing literature.
Subjects: 
bundling
bargaining
cheap talk
JEL: 
D82
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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