Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31429
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dc.contributor.authorChami, Ralphen_US
dc.contributor.authorHess, Gregory D.en_US
dc.contributor.editorClaremont Institute for Economic Policy Studiesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:06:21Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:06:21Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31429-
dc.description.abstractWhy do some U.S. states have higher levels of marital formation than others? This paper introduces an economic model wherein a state's representative individual may choose to marry in order to diversity his or her idiosyncratic income risk. The paper demonstrates that such a diversification motive is enhanced for some utility functions when a state's level of undiversifiable risk becomes larger, and when a state's initial income and growth rate is lower. A test of the model's predictious, using cross - sectional data for the 50 U.S. states, suggests that there is broad support for a risk sharing motive for marriage as well as for a precautionary attitude towards risk. - Consumption Insurance ; Marriageen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aClaremont McKenna College, Department of Economics |cClaremont, CAen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking paper series // Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies |x2002-07en_US
dc.subject.jelJ12en_US
dc.subject.jelD1en_US
dc.subject.jelE21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwRegionale Disparitäten_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwVerdienstausfallen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.subject.stwEherechten_US
dc.subject.stwEheen_US
dc.titleFor better or for worse? State-level marital formation and risk sharingen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn366234595en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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