Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314223 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Applied Economics [ISSN:] 1667-6726 [Volume:] 26 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 2194599 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1-7
Publisher: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Abstract: 
In the context of a vertically differentiated duopoly model with endogenous quality choice, we analyzes the welfare effect of overlapping ownership when the market is fully covered. The results show that overlapping ownership, while detrimental for consumer surplus, may increase or decrease social welfare and firms' profits. In particular, when the overlapping ownership structure is such that the lower-quality firm acquires a positive share of the higher-quality firm's profit, an increase in overlapping ownership reduces the lower-quality firm's incentive to compete against its rival, leading to a higher level of industry profit and, therefore, a higher level of overall welfare.
Subjects: 
consumer surplus
Overlapping ownership
social welfare
vertical differentiation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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