Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314093 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Applied Economics [ISSN:] 1667-6726 [Volume:] 23 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 299-315
Verlag: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Zusammenfassung: 
This article examines whether an increase in political participation biased toward low-income voters - and concentrated in legislative elections - impacts federal representatives' allocation of resources from the federal budget to Brazilian municipalities. We use a regression discontinuity design that exploits the assignment of electronic voting to municipalities based on population size to identify the causal effect of enfranchisement on the allocation of federal public spending. We find that an increase of 1 percentage point in the valid-vote-to-turnout ratio for federal representatives in a municipality increases the allocation of funds from the federal budget by 3.3%, and that experienced politicians are more responsive to the enfranchisement of low-income voters.
Schlagwörter: 
Electronic voting
political participation
politically motivated transfers
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
2.02 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.