Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313100 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Helsinki GSE Discussion Papers No. 32
Verlag: 
Helsinki Graduate School of Economics, Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
Many auctions and procurement contests entail nontrivial bidding costs, which makes the bidders' participation decisions endogenous to the auction design. We analyze the effect of different auction rules on potential bidders' incentives to participate. We focus on first-price auctions with affiliated common values and a large pool of potential bidders. Our main interest is on auctions where the realized number of bidders is unknown at the bidding stage. In contrast to the standard case, both participation and bidding decisions are often non-monotonic in the symmetric equilibrium of our model. The expected revenue to the seller is often higher in the auction where the realized number of participating bidders is not disclosed.
JEL: 
D44
ISBN: 
978-952-7543-31-3
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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