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dc.contributor.authorDekel, Eddieen
dc.contributor.authorJackson, Matthew O.en
dc.contributor.authorWolinsky, Asheren
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:19:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:19:20Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31252-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oþering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1433en
dc.subject.jelP16en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordvote buyingen
dc.subject.keywordlobbyingen
dc.subject.keywordlegislaturesen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwWahlen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleVote buying II: legislatures and lobbying-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587536950en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1433en

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