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dc.contributor.authorDekel, Eddieen
dc.contributor.authorJackson, Matthew O.en
dc.contributor.authorWolinsky, Asheren
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:19:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:19:14Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31243-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' budget constraints and voter preferences. For instance, if only campaign promises are allowed, then the winning party depends not only on the relative size of the budgets, but also on the excess support of the party with the a priori majority, where the excess support is measured in terms of the (minimal) total utility of supporting voters who are in excess of the majority needed to win. If up front vote buying is permitted, and voters care directly about how they vote (as a legislator would), then the determination of the winning party depends on a weighted comparison of the two parties' budgets plus half of the total utility of their supporting voters. These results suggest that vote buying can lead to an inefficient party winning in equilibrium. We find that under some circumstances, if parties budgets are raised through donations, then vote buying can be efficient. Finally, we provide some results on vote buying in the face of uncertainty.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1386en
dc.subject.jelP16en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordvote buyingen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.keywordcampaign promisesen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwWahlen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleVote buying-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn586098062en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1386en

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