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dc.contributor.authorMailath, George J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorOlszewski, Wojciechen_US
dc.description.abstractunder the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure towards private monitoring (the case of almost-public monitoring), while strict equilibria in unbounded-recall strategies are typically not robust. We prove that the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. The general result uses calendar time in an integral way in the construction of the strategy profile. If the players' action spaces are sufficiently rich, then the strategy profile can be chosen to be independent of calendar time. Either result can then be used to prove a folk theorem for repeated games with almost-perfect almost-public monitoring.en_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|x1462en_US
dc.subject.keywordRepeated gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordbounded recall strategiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordfolk theoremen_US
dc.subject.keywordimperfect monitoringen_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.titleFolk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoringen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US

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