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dc.contributor.authorDekel, Eddieen_US
dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drewen_US
dc.contributor.authorMorris, Stephenen_US
dc.description.abstractWe and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diĆ¾erence between the smallest for which the action is interim correlated rationalizable. We a strategic topology in which a sequence of types converges if and only if this distance tends to zero for any action and game. Thus a sequence of types converges in the strategic topology if that smallest does not jump either up or down in the limit. As applied to sequences, the upper-semicontinuity prop-erty is equivalent to convergence in the product topology, but the lower-semicontinuity property is a strictly stronger requirement, as shown by the electronic mail game. In the strategic topology, the set of .nite types (types describable by .nite type spaces) is dense but the set of .nite common-prior types is not.en_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|x1417en_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon knowledgeen_US
dc.subject.keyworduniversal type spaceen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic topology.en_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen_US
dc.titleTopologies on typesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US

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