Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31173 
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dc.contributor.authorSpiegel, Yossien
dc.contributor.authorWilkie, Simonen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:08Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:08Z-
dc.date.issued2000-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31173-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the design of nonlinear prices by a multiproduct monopolist who serves customers with multidimensional but correlated types. We show that the monopoly can exploit the correlations between consumers' types to design pricing mechanisms that fully extract the surplus from each consumer. Our main insight is that regardless of the dimensionality of the consumers types and the number of goods that the monopoly produces, the surplus that each consumer gets from buying is a scalar. Hence, it is possible to design a two step mechanism where in the first step the monopoly induces the consumers to make efficient purchasing decisions (given their private information), and in the second step the monopoly extracts the surplus from each consumer via a (random) fixed fee.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1299en
dc.subject.jelD42en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordnonlinear pricesen
dc.subject.keywordmultidimensional typesen
dc.subject.keywordcorrelated typesen
dc.subject.keywordincremental costen
dc.subject.keywordClarke-Groves mechanismsen
dc.titleOptimal multiproduct nonlinear pricing with correlated consumer types-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn333307453en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1299en

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