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dc.contributor.authorSpiegel, Yossien_US
dc.contributor.authorWilkie, Simonen_US
dc.description.abstractWe examine the design of nonlinear prices by a multiproduct monopolist who serves customers with multidimensional but correlated types. We show that the monopoly can exploit the correlations between consumers' types to design pricing mechanisms that fully extract the surplus from each consumer. Our main insight is that regardless of the dimensionality of the consumers types and the number of goods that the monopoly produces, the surplus that each consumer gets from buying is a scalar. Hence, it is possible to design a two step mechanism where in the first step the monopoly induces the consumers to make efficient purchasing decisions (given their private information), and in the second step the monopoly extracts the surplus from each consumer via a (random) fixed fee.en_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|x1299en_US
dc.subject.keywordnonlinear pricesen_US
dc.subject.keywordmultidimensional typesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorrelated typesen_US
dc.subject.keywordincremental costen_US
dc.subject.keywordClarke-Groves mechanismsen_US
dc.titleOptimal multiproduct nonlinear pricing with correlated consumer typesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US

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