Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311589 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Texto para Discussão No. 3068
Publisher: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasília
Abstract (Translated): 
The study examines the extent to which the Legislative Branch is involved in the processing of economic policies sent by the Executive Branch, as part of the process of political delegation. It argues that, as the PT administrations adopted a developmentalist economic paradigm, increasing the distance of preferences from the other members of the coalitions, the Executive sought to transform delegation into abdication. The Legislative branch is expected to react by increasing the levels of intra-coalition conflicts. In order to test these hypotheses, we examined whether the PT governments attempted to control the economic affairs committees and whether they actually sent more developmentalist proposals. With regard to the Legislative, we checked whether members of the coalitions reacted by trying to amend more of the Executive's bills and whether the success rate of the governments in turning bills into law decreased. To do this, we assessed economic legislation submitted by the Executive to the Finance and Taxation Committee (CFT) and the Economic Development, Industry, Trade and Services Committee (CDeics). The results corroborate our hypotheses, demonstrating that the Legislative challenges more developmental economic policies.
Subjects: 
economic policy
Executive
Legislative
delegation
coalition presidentialism
JEL: 
E02
H11
H77
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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