Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/309609 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Management and Economics [ISSN:] 2543-5361 [Volume:] 50 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 7-26
Publisher: 
De Gruyter Open, Warsaw
Abstract: 
EU Member States outside the Eurozone are hesitating to enter the European Banking Union (EBU) and to establish "close cooperation" in bank supervision with the ECB. This paper analyzes the consequences of such asymmetric integration for financial stability in Europe. It argues that the main obstacles against establishing close cooperation are a lack of voting rights and insufficient access to the fiscal backstop provided by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The paper presents arguments as to why international cooperation in bank supervision could be welfare improving, if multinational banks are dominant. It also discusses suitable reform options for making it more attractive for EU Member States to begin a close cooperation with the ECB.
Subjects: 
multinational banking
capital requirements
bank resolution
regulatory arbitrage
JEL: 
G38
G21
F36
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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