Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307794 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Helsinki GSE Discussion Papers No. 13
Verlag: 
Helsinki Graduate School of Economics, Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
We theoretically investigate the effects of strategic pre-commitment in multilateral dynamic bargaining. Each round features a commitment stage in which players can declare that they will reject any proposal giving them less than a self-imposed threshold. Such declarations bind in the ensuing voting stage with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of Markov perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanimity rule, an inefficient equilibrium always exists, and efficient equilibria exist only if the probability that commitments bind is sufficiently large and the number of players is sufficiently small. Under any (super)majority rule, every equilibrium is efficient. The results suggest that the unanimity rule is particularly damaging if the number of legislators is large and the time lags between consecutive sessions are long.
Schlagwörter: 
bargaining
commitment
conflict
delay
environmental agreements
international negotiations
legislative
majority
multilateral
unanimity
JEL: 
C7
D7
ISBN: 
978-952-7543-12-2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.