Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306853 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
BERG Working Paper Series No. 197
Publisher: 
Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG), Bamberg
Abstract: 
Intra-party contests, such as the US primaries, are often used to select a candidate for a subsequent cross-party election. A more accurate selection may improve the quality of the candidate but detract more resources from the subsequent campaign. We model this trade-off as a problem of contest design and show that extreme accuracy levels are optimal: maximum accuracy if the potential candidates are sufficiently heterogeneous, and a highly random selection otherwise. In an extension of our model, the heterogeneity between potential candidates reflects the degree of political polarization within a party. Our results explain varying primary designs within and between countries and shed light upon the paradox of limited competition within democratic parties.
Subjects: 
Contest Design
Accuracy
Elections
Intra-Party Competition
Political Polarization
JEL: 
C72
D72
ISBN: 
978-3-949224-18-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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