Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306241 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance (JEF) [ISSN:] 2373-1761 [Volume:] 24 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 9 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 209-247
Verlag: 
Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management and The Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance (AEF), Malibu, CA and Los Angeles, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
An entrepreneur shares business risk with the investors providing capital for her firm. Risk sharing is per se beneficial, but also results in an agency problem from diminished incentives for the entrepreneur. This classical trade-off depends on the financial contracting between the entrepreneur and the financier. As an alternative to debt or equity, we consider musharaka financing, an Islamic profit and loss sharing contract. First, we show that debt is inferior to equity or musharaka even though debt financing ensures first best efforts in our model. Whether financing with equity or by use of musharaka results in higher utility for the entrepreneur depends on how the firm's risks are related and on the structure of the costs the entrepreneur has to bear when spending effort.
Schlagwörter: 
Entrepreneurial finance
Islamic finance
Equity
Musharaka
Partnership
Profit and loss sharing
Risk sharing
Managerial incentives
JEL: 
D25
D81
D82
G32
L26
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Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
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