Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306057 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment Journal [ISSN:] 1864-6042 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 123-136
Publisher: 
De Gruyter, Berlin
Abstract: 
Central bank independence has been championed on the grounds that it avoids political business cycles, the time-inconsistency problem of discretionary monetary policy, and political conflicts. However, after the financial crisis, central banks have resorted to unconventional monetary policies and embraced additional tasks, making monetary authorities more exposed to political interference. This new reality has put into question the long-lasting consensus on the desirability of central bank independence. We add to this debate a new argument in support of that independence, namely, it internalizes the fiscal spillovers that arise in a monetary union, which is not a full fiscal union.
Subjects: 
Central Bank design
fiscal policies
international fiscal spillovers
monetary union
JEL: 
E52
E58
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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