Publisher:
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung, Abteilung für Wirtschaftspolitik und Ordnungsökonomik, Freiburg i. Br.
Abstract:
Does whistleblowing deter rule violations when such violations are believed to be common? We examine this question in an online experiment about collaborative tax evasion. We vary whether subjects can blow the whistle on their partner in crime and introduce a high-evasion environment by framing the social norm such that evasion is expected to be common. Our findings show that giving partners in crime the option to blow the whistle on their partner does not significantly deter collaborative tax evasion. Collaborative tax evasion significantly increases in a high-evasion environment compared to an unspecified norm environment, even when whistleblowing is possible. This finding underlines that the norm environment is crucial for evasion and corroborates that whistleblowing is ineffective when both partners benefit from collaborative evasion. We offer several explanations for these findings.