Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/303747 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Cogent Economics & Finance [ISSN:] 2332-2039 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 2111057 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-17
Publisher: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Abstract: 
This study examines the influence of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB), Board of Directors (BOD), Risk Officers (RO), Audit Committee, and market competition (Lerner) on the Islamic Law Compliance Risk (ILCR). We use a sample of full-fledged Islamic banks in Indonesia with an observation period of 2009-2019. Data analysis uses Fixed Effect Model (FEM). Our results show that SSB and BOD are not proven to be able to control ILCR. ILCR can be decreased by increasing the number of audit committees and the proportion of independent RO. In addition, the Lerner index has a positive influence ILCR. The results of the robustness test also confirm the results of this study. This research extends the previous studies on evaluating the risk-taking of Islamic Banks beyond the common risk (insolvency, liquidity, credit, and market), particularly the unique risks faced by Islamic banks. This study recommends increasing the effectiveness of SSB and BOD supervision on bank operations, increasing the ILCR.
Subjects: 
Islamic law compliance risk
non-halal income
shariah compliance
Shariah Supervisory Board
risk officer
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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