Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/303684 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Cogent Economics & Finance [ISSN:] 2332-2039 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 2087290 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-27
Publisher: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Abstract: 
This study investigates the relationship between central bank independence and financial stability in a global sample covering 56 countries from 1980 to 2012. We find strong and robust evidence that central bank independence and its four dimensions (personnel independence, financial independence, policy independence, and central bank objectives) are negatively associated with bank systemic risk. In addition, the results indicate that the reductive effect of central bank independence on systemic risk is more pronounced during actual episodes of banking crises. Moreover, our results suggest that the democratic environment plays a vital role in moderating the central bank independence - systemic risk nexus.
Subjects: 
central bank independence
systemic risk
democracy
JEL: 
G21
E58
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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