Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/303634 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Cogent Economics & Finance [ISSN:] 2332-2039 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 2066763 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-23
Publisher: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Abstract: 
This paper examines whether share repurchase announcements are signals of undervaluation or insiders' opportunistic activities by investigating insider trading patterns surrounding buyback announcements in Vietnam. Consistent with the insider opportunism hypothesis, we show that insiders are net buyers before the announcements but they sell intensively after the event. We also find that repurchase announcements with subsequent net insider selling are not followed by an improvement in firms' operating performance but associated with underperformance in long-term stock returns. Overall, our findings suggest that a proportion of repurchase announcements in Vietnam are subject to insider opportunism; therefore, short-swing rules should be regulated to limit insider opportunistically trading around repurchase announcements.
Subjects: 
share repurchase
insider trading
signaling hypothesis
insider opportunism
managerial opportunism
Vietnam
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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