Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/303386 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
LEQS Paper No. 103
Verlag: 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), European Institute, London
Zusammenfassung: 
Despite widely held views on fiscal adjustment as a political minefield for incumbents, the empirical literature on the issue has been surprisingly inconclusive. A crucial variable that has been often overlooked in the debate is partisan politics. Building on the micro-logic of Albert Hirschman's "exit, voice and loyalty" framework, this article offers a novel theoretical perspective on the conditioning impact of partisanship in the electoral arena. Due to their more limited exit options at their disposal, left-wing voters are less likely to inflict electoral punishment on their parties, offering the latter an electoral advantage over their right-wing rivals. Relying on the largest cross-national dataset to date on the evolution of close to 100 parties' popularity rating in 21 democracies, time-series-cross-section results confirm this electoral advantage.
Schlagwörter: 
fiscal adjustment
partisan politics
exit voice and loyalty
party competition
elections
popularity
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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