Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/303304 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
LEQS Paper No. 21
Publisher: 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), European Institute, London
Abstract: 
Substantial theoretical and conceptual advances have been made with respect to agenda-setting as a determinant for policy outcomes. An actor-centred perspective on frames and venues is core to this literature, structure as a single standing category has received less attention. In this paper we argue that these results should be combined with bureaucratic politics in the European Commission to further our understanding of agenda setting processes in the European Union. Typically, a legislative proposal of the Commission is produced by a lead department which collaborates with a number of other departments on a partly formalized basis before a joint Commission decision is taken. Different services hold different positions on specific policies. We show that structures and rules governing the process yield the potential for some positions to be systematically more strongly represented in the proposals entering inter-institutional decision-making. We complement our argument by providing evidence of interaction patterns when it comes to internal coordination.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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