Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30129 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen
dc.contributor.authorNeugart, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-26-
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-05T15:43:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-05T15:43:33Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30129-
dc.description.abstractWhen enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aPhilipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics |cMarburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x2009,15en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelK31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlabor market regulationen
dc.subject.keywordlabor courtsen
dc.subject.keyworduncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten
dc.titleLabor market regulation and the legal system-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn603932819en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
233.19 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.