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dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen
dc.contributor.authorNeugart, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-26-
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-05T15:43:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-05T15:43:33Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30129-
dc.description.abstractWhen enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aPhilipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics |cMarburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x2009,15en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelK31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlabor market regulationen
dc.subject.keywordlabor courtsen
dc.subject.keyworduncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten
dc.titleLabor market regulation and the legal system-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn603932819en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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