Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Feld, Lars P.
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Marburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge 2004,11
Starting from the economic theory of federalism, this chapter surveys the development of EU revenue, spending and off-budget activities, discusses the redistributive impact of EU finances on member states, and budgetary decision-making procedures. The analysis is guided by a political economics perspective on the interaction between the different players in EU decision-making and the institutional restrictions they face. This involves the interests of the Commission, the Parliament as well as those of the single countries in the Council. They are restricted by the system of member states’ contributions to the EU and the balanced budget requirement, but also by the budgetary procedures that determine individual decision-making powers.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
158.77 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.