Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/285088 
Title (translated): 
Contaminación, sindicato verde e industria de redes
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 48 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 139-173
Publisher: 
Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía, Santiago de Chile
Abstract: 
In a network industry, this paper investigates the impact of network effects on total pollution under the presence of a union interested to "local" environmental damages (e.g., polluting production processes damaging workers' health and the local environment where workers live). Under monopoly, it is shown that, on the one hand, network effects tend to increase the investments in the cleaning technology but, on the other hand, increase the polluting output; consequently, the effects on the total pollution are ambiguous. We also find that total pollution reduces (increases) with increasing network effects intensity if the market is sufficiently large (small). Moreover, the pollution-reducing result of increasing network effects appears when the existing network effects, the union's environ - mental concerns and the technological efficiency are sufficiently large. These findings are qualitatively confirmed under Cournot duopoly, offering empirical, as well as policy, implications.
Subjects: 
Network goods
Cleaning technology
Pollution production
Green Unions
Monopoly
Cournot duopoly
JEL: 
J51
L12
Q52
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-sa Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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