Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284896 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Texto para Discussão No. 2840
Publisher: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasília
Abstract (Translated): 
This work is divided into two complementary parts. In the first part, we develop a partial equilibrium model, through which it is possible to analyze the influence of tariff modicity and the illegal occupation of poles on four agents: energy distributors, telecommunications operators, and energy and telecommunications customers. The results obtained show, for four simulated pricing scenarios, the impacts on economic efficiency and social welfare. In the second part, game theory was used to analyze pole sharing between energy distributors and telecommunications operators, in particular the illegal occupation of part of the operators. The simulations evaluated both an extreme scenario and also contexts in which players have adaptative behaviour.
Subjects: 
social welfare
infrastructure sharing
pole sharing
partial equilibrium
game theory
electrical
economic efficiency
incentives
public policy
JEL: 
D04
D42
D46
D47
D61
K23
K32
L11
L12
L94
L96
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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