Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284304 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 954
Publisher: 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, London
Abstract: 
The choices of a dynamically inconsistent individual depend on whether she commits to consumption ahead of time or chooses consumption in the moment. In individual-choice settings, it is normatively ambiguous whether such an individual's choices with commitment or in the moment are "better". This impasse can be overcome in settings in which dynamically inconsistent individuals interact strategically. Policy implications are discussed.
Subjects: 
dynamic inconsistency
commitment
welfare
JEL: 
D60
D90
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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