Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27749
Authors: 
Gerke, Rafael
Hammermann, Felix
Lewis, Vivien
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2009,23
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the optimal monetary policy response to a shock to collateral when policymakers act under discretion and face model uncertainty. The analysis is based on a New Keynesian model where banks supply loans to transaction constrained consumers. Our results confirm the literature on model uncertainty with respect to a cost-push shock. Insuring against model misspecification leads to a more aggressive policy response. The same is true for a shock to collateral. A preference for robustness leads to a more aggressive policy. Increasing the weight attached to interest rate smoothing raises the degree of aggressiveness. Our results indicate that a preference for robustness crucially depends on the way different types of disturbances affect the economy: in the case of a shock to collateral the policymaker does not need to be as much worried about model misspecification as in the case of a conventional cost-push shock.
Subjects: 
Optimal monetary policy
discretion
model uncertainty
banking
collateral
JEL: 
E44
E58
E32
ISBN: 
978-3-86558-550-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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