Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/277472 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention (EJEEP) [ISSN:] 2052-7772 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 129-138
Publisher: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham
Abstract: 
The euro area crisis was less a crisis of the euro than a crisis of the Maastricht doctrine. The latter was based on a triple ban: no monetization of fiscal deficits, no bail-out, no sovereign default. The euro architecture was also based on a strict division of tasks: the European Central Bank would stabilize prices in the euro area as a whole, whereas national governments would stabilize their own economies in case of idiosyncratic shocks. To make things even more dysfunctional, bank supervision remained under the competence of the member states. Although much has been done since the crisis to reform the Maastricht framework, there are still major flaws that weaken the single currency.
Subjects: 
Economic and Monetary Union
economic governance
economic convergence
JEL: 
E42
E61
F45
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.