Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/272323 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 831
Publisher: 
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA), Buenos Aires
Abstract: 
This paper provides a deep analysis into the legal dispute between Argentina and the holdouts as a consequence of the 2001 sovereign default. This paper highlights how the legal conflict helped uncover fundamental issues in the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). Questions regarding overarching injunctions, ambiguous interpretation of boilerplate clauses and the arguable judicial overreach of foreign court lead to necessary changes on standard clauses in sovereign debt contracts. A multidisciplinary approach combining aspects of law and economics was applied in order to fully appreciate the complexity of the subject, as well as the impact this particular case had on posterior sovereign debt contracts.
Subjects: 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Holdouts
Pari Passu
JEL: 
F34
H63
G01
K00
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
414.58 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.