Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270033 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Cogent Economics & Finance [ISSN:] 2332-2039 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 1869380 [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-14
Publisher: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Abstract: 
The aim of the paper is to compare the sensitivity of a government's fiscal policy and a central bank's monetary policy, which are in Nash equilibrium in the case of a non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank in Czechia, Hungary, and Romania. The analysis for each country is conducted from the date of its accession to the European Union. The research period for Czechia and Hungary includes the quarters 2004Q2-2019Q2, and for Romania, 2007Q1-2019Q2. The study has demonstrated that in Romania the government's response to interest rate changes is the strongest and the central bank's response to changes in the budget deficit turned out to be the weakest. On the other hand, the strongest response of the central bank to changes in the budget deficit turned out to be in Hungary, which means that the central bank in Hungary makes a significant correction of interest rates as a result of changes in the budget deficit.
Subjects: 
fiscal policy
game theory
monetary policy
Nash equilibrium
non-cooperative game
policy mix
JEL: 
C70
C72
E52
E62
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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