Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26931 
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dc.contributor.authorHöffler, Felixen
dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Klaus M.en
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-12-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:53Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26931-
dc.description.abstractIn some markets vertically integrated firms sell directly to final customers but also to independent downstream firms with whom they then compete on the downstream market. It is often argued that resellers intensify competition and benefit consumers, in particular when wholesale prices are regulated. However, we show that (i) resale may increase prices and make consumers worse off and that (ii) standard retail minus X regulation may increase prices and harm consumers. Our analysis suggests that this is more likely if the number of integrated firms is small, the degree of product differentiation is low, and/or if competition is spatial.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2007,16en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelL11en
dc.subject.jelL42en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordResale regulationen
dc.subject.keywordwholesaleen
dc.subject.keywordspatial product differentiationen
dc.subject.keywordnon-spatial producten
dc.subject.stwVerkaufen
dc.subject.stwVerbraucheren
dc.subject.stwVorprodukten
dc.subject.stwPreisbindungen
dc.subject.stwKonsumentenrenteen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleTwo tales on resale-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn551651792en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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