Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26928 
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dc.contributor.authorJansen, Josen
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-12-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:51Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26928-
dc.description.abstractI study the incentives of oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common demand intercept. Since firms may fail to acquire information even when they invest in information acquisition, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. Firms may earn higher expected profits under such a selective disclosure regime than under the regimes where firms commit to share all or no information. In particular, this holds under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, if the firms have sufficiently flat information acquisition cost functions. For steeper cost functions Cournot duopolists prefer strategic disclosure, if their goods are sufficiently differentiated.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2007,13en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL40en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordoligopolistic competitionen
dc.subject.keywordinformation acquisitionen
dc.subject.keywordinformation sharingen
dc.subject.keywordcommitmenten
dc.subject.keywordcommon valueen
dc.subject.keywordproduct differentiationen
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwInformationsaustauschen
dc.subject.stwOligopolen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwProduktdifferenzierungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleInformation acquisition and strategic disclosure in oligopoly-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn551625511en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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