Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267503 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 038.2022
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The main results concern the amount of information that is transmitted in equilibrium and the language used by senders to convey such information. Fully revealing and pure-strategy equilibria exist but are not plausible. I first identify sufficient conditions under which equilibria are essentially unique, robust, and always exist, and then deliver a complete characterization of these equilibria. As an application, I study the informative value of different judicial procedures.
Subjects: 
Signaling
Multi-sender
Competition
Misreporting
Communication
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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