Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265231 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ESRB Working Paper Series No. 130
Verlag: 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies leverage regulation and monetary policy when equity investors and/or creditors have distorted beliefs relative to a planner. We characterize how the optimal leverage regulation responds to arbitrary changes in investors' and creditors' beliefs and relate our results to practical scenarios. We show that the optimal regulation depends on the type and magnitude of such changes. Optimism by investors calls for looser leverage regulation, while optimism by creditors, or jointly by both investors and creditors, calls for tighter leverage regulation. Monetary policy should be tightened (loosened) in response to either investors' or creditors' optimism (pessimism).
Schlagwörter: 
prudential policy
distorted beliefs
leverage regulation
bailouts
monetary policy
JEL: 
G28
G21
E61
E52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9472-237-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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