Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262688 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 286
Publisher: 
University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Chicago, IL
Abstract: 
I examine how mandatory disclosure of fiscal payment information in developed countries affects fiscal revenue contributions and investments by multinational firms in less developed countries. In Europe and Canada, extractive firms have to publicly disclose their payments to foreign host governments in a granular report on their corporate website to discourage the bribery of foreign public officials and other illicit payment avoidance practices. Using data on firms' extractive activities abroad and exploiting the staggered adoption of extrac- tion payment reports across developed countries, I find that disclosing companies increase their payments to host governments and that public officials book a higher fraction of these payments into government ledgers, particularly in corrupt countries. However, the higher government revenue comes at a cost { disclosing firms decrease and reallocate investments relative to non-disclosing competitors. Additional cross-sectional evidence indicates that the increased threat of public shaming and legal enforcement are two important mecha- nisms through which these disclosures generate real effects. Overall, my evidence suggests that extraction payment disclosures improve fiscal revenue collection but have unintended investment consequences for multinational firms.
Subjects: 
Real Effects
Disclosure Regulation
Corruption
Fiscal Revenues
Foreign Investment
Corporate Social Responsibility
JEL: 
G14
G38
H20
H26
K22
L71
M41
M48
O10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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