Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/258596 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Risk and Financial Management [ISSN:] 1911-8074 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 10 [Article No.:] 492 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-14
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
I examine the relationship between democracy and the perceived risk of corruption in a panel of 130 countries. My panel model controls for country fixed effects and enables the estimation of a within-country relationship between democracy and corruption. My main finding is that democracy significantly reduces the risk of corruption, but only in countries where ethnic fractionalization is low. In strongly fractionalized countries a transition from autocracy to democracy does not significantly reduce corruption. One explanation for these findings is that the corruption-reducing effect of greater accountability of politicians under democracy is undermined by the common pool problem; fractionalization increases the severity of the common pool problem.
Subjects: 
corruption
democracy
fractionalization
common pool problem
JEL: 
H01
P00
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.